This paper was presented at the conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) South East chapter by Chidi Ezegwu

Theme: Politics and Governance in the South East Today

Held at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria

Date: 22nd – 25th November 2006


INTRODUCTION
To many, the history of electoral system in Nigeria could be seen as the history of electoral fraud. Every party in power has always tried to ensure victory for itself. Nigerian political parties go into elections not to win peoples mandate but to use all their available means to rig elections in their favour. The party in power had always been at advantage to out-rig others, simply because, it advantageously controls the instruments and virtually all the wherewithal to do so. International observers during the last 2003 election noted as Abati (2005) wrote, “Nigerian politicians used a combination of about 55 methods of rigging”

The rate of the problems associated with manual voting and voting system in the world has led to re-consideration and search for a better and cost effective voting system by various countries of the world. Presently, the whole world is talking about transparency and democratisation, and at the other hand the globalised world is driven by technology. Nigeria has as well taken a bold step to join other countries with the recommendation of the 2005 National Political Reform Conference, and eventual adoption of the system by the Independent Electoral Commission in July 2005. In their best judgment, the system is the remedy for virtually all electoral fraud in the country. This step, as wise as it may appear, calls for re-examination and critical analysis of its overriding problems and prospects. The sincerity of their choice and decision to apply the system as solution to electoral malpractices in Nigeria is another issue of concern as oppositions to the adoption of the system allay. The electronic voting system, however good, like other human efforts at solving contemporary problems, has its own flaws, which will also be complicated by the Nigerian setting that is bedraggled with stagnation, corruption and backwardness.

This work therefore explores the problems and prospects of adopting electronic voting system in Nigeria by the Independent National Electoral Commission, which has received the blessing of the present leadership of the country. It focuses on the practicability of the system in Nigeria, with reference to the contemporary nature, socio-political and economic setting, the structure and history of the country.
TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF ELECTRONIC VOTING S SYSTEMS
The Machines
Electronic voting (e-voting) is a generic term that is applied here to refer to all aspects of voting that involves some element of casting or counting of votes by electronic means. It may involve any, or a combination, of the different methods identified by Fisher (2003):
Electronic counting (e-counting) refers to those systems that provide some form of automated count of votes that are cast using traditional methods (i.e. by physically marking a ballot paper by hand), whether in a polling station or by some other remote form such as postal ballots. While most forms of e-voting are likely to include some element of electronic counting, the term is reserved here to refer to those systems that only involve electronic systems in the counting of the votes

Electronic machine voting involves the use of dedicated machines to record votes for later counting. Machines may be sited either within polling stations or in other suitable locations where the public gather or have general access, such as leisure or shopping centers. These technologies may include, among others:
i. Touch screen systems that enable voters to cast their vote by touching relevant parts of a screen. These systems are used extensively in the Netherlands and were tested in three UK local government elections in 2000 - Bury, Salford and Stratford- upon-Avon
ii. PC based technologies that enable voters to cast their vote using a combination of screen and keypad (or a mouse) to register their ballot. This type of system is currently used in Brazil. Static or mobile kiosks that are located at convenient points within a constituency (but not in polling stations) or are transported around to different points to facilitate voting (for example, to workplaces, hospitals, elderly people's homes and so on). These systems use either keypad or touch screen technology to allow voters to cast their ballot.
Collectively, these types of systems are often known as Direct Recording Electronic
(DRE) machines.
iii. Remote Voting by Electronic Means (RVEM) is the other extreme of e-voting. It involves voting from places other than designated polling places and may involve a number of different technologies including:
a. Telephone voting using touch-tone telephones to register a vote. This type of system may operate either through fixed (land) line telephone systems or cellular (mobile) telephones Within the UK such voting systems have been used for advisory referendums in some local authorities (Milton Keynes, Bristol and Croydon)
b. SMS text voting using the Short Message Service (SMS) facility on mobile telephones to cast a ballot
c. Internet voting may be developed to allow individuals to vote from anywhere using the internet.
d. Interactive Digital Television (DTV) using the interactive capacity of evolving facilities to enable voters to cast their ballots via their televisions.
Ennis (2004) describes various types of electronc voting systems and their function that includes
Direct Recording Electronic: Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines are often favored because they can incorporate assistive technologies for handicapped people, allowing them to vote without involving another person in the process. However, most DRE's do not keep a voter verifiable paper ballot for re-counts and audits, making them arguably the least secure of all voting systems invented to date.
Mark-sense (optical scan) voting: In mark-sense voting the user marks a paper ballot and feeds it into a ballot box. The votes may be tallied by automatic sensors at a central location or at the precinct. With precinct-tallied votes, the systems usually verify that the ballot is legitimate as they accept the ballot. Improper marks on the ballot are the primary cause of problems with mark-sense voting. The marks may be inadvertent, accidentally outside the prescribed locations, made with an incompatible writing instrument, or incomplete.
Punch card voting: With punch card ballots, voters create holes in prepared ballot cards to indicate their choices. There are two main known vendors of this systems, Datavote and Votomatic. Datavote systems use a cutting tool and vacuum to clean away material from unperforated cards indicating the voters' choices. Votomatic machines require the voter to punch out a perforated rectangle from the card using a stylus.
The Datavote systems tend to have higher accuracy than Votomatic machines. Votomatic machines suffer from all manner of problems related to handling the perforated cards - problems that featured prominently in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election
Internet voting: With Internet voting people cast their ballots online, generally via a web interface, although email voting has occasionally been tried. With web voting the voter navigates to the proper election site using a web browser on an ordinary computer system (PC) and authenticates himself or herself to see the appropriate blank ballot form presented onscreen. The voter then fills out the ballot form and, when satisfied, clicks the "cast vote" button to send the completed ballot back to the election server.
Telephone voting: Telephone voting allows people to call different telephone numbers to indicate preference for different options, or a voter might call one number and indicate a preference by pressing buttons in a menu system. Its main drawback is the difficulty in verifying the identity of the voter and in permitting only one vote per person. Its chief advantage is the ease in getting people to participate
Some corporations routinely use Internet voting to elect officers and Board members and for other proxy elections. However, its use for public elections, where the security, privacy, and auditability standards are much higher, is generally considered prohibitively dangerous because, besides all of the dangers of ordinary electronic voting, there are additional severe security problems inherent in the PC and in the Internet that have no good solutions with current technology.
The election system of Buenos Aires for example is fairly simple. The voting machines are similar to an automatic teller machine, consisting of a metal cabinet with a numeric keyboard, a computer screen, a hard disk and a printing mechanism that will provide voters with a paper record. Voters will cast their ballots discreetly behind privacy curtains

Upon arriving at the booths, voters will hand their identity cards to an election official - no change from the normal procedure - who then will enter the citizens' personal information into a small terminal. Voters then will go behind the curtain to type a number corresponding to the candidate of their choice. A picture of the candidate will pop up on the screen immediately.

If the voter's choice has been read correctly, the voter will press a green key, finalizing the choice. If not, the voter simply presses a red key to correct the mistake. In case a voter is not willing to cast his or her ballot for any candidate on the slate, there is a white key for the "none of the above" vote. After a vote is entered, the machine makes a sound and prints a paper record.

Alternatively, there are other systems as used in India. The Indian Election process is distributed in such a way that there are never more than 1500 voters for a single polling booth. So, even if armed men capture the polling station, they cannot cast 1500 bogus votes in less than 5 hours, and Indian police is not as slow as the Hollywood movies project them to be. No voter has to travel more than 2 Kilometers to cast his vote. It is fairly easy for an election officer or opposition political agents to identify people who attempt to appear twice with different identity. (The Ink on the finger is the main reason). Also:
a. The System accepts only 5 votes in a minute.
b. The Government Issued Voter Identity Card, through Public Distribution System’s Ration Card, when he enters the polling station.
c. Voter's finger is marked with a special ink, in such a way that the ink spreads from finger skin to nail in a small dot. One cannot remove this Ink without hurting himself. The Ink washes away in two week's time.
d. The Electoral Officer then Presses a button on his Control Unit that releases a single ballot, for the voter to use, this of course is electronic so it just enables the Voting unit to register one Vote.
e. Now Voter enters the voting Booth, and presses a Button in front of name and Election Symbol of the Candidate. This action blinks an ‘LED’ in front of the candidate's name and sounds a loud and long Beep, that declares that the vote is casted.
And here is how the results are obtained from the machines.
a. After the voting is over, electoral officer presses the Close switch on the Control Unit, after which the unit registers no votes. The total number of the Votes registered are noted by all stake holders (political party agents) and then the control units are put into its own special carrying case, and sealed for transport.
b. Control Units from all Polling stations are transported to the nearest District headquarters.
c. On the day of counting the seals of the Control Units are opened. The control unit has a Results Button that is physically secured by a protective seal, this button is pressed to obtain the results. The Machine gives the Serial number of the Candidate, and the votes that he has won.
d. The Election commission takes a decision to ask for a re-election if the machines were found to be tempered with. Or if the count of signatures or thumb impressions (yes, India's illiterate also take part in the democracy) on the voter register do not tally with the number of votes registered by the Voting Machine. In this election, about a 100 polling booths, (I think) were asked to conduct the election again. This number is small, for the size of Indian elections.
e. In case of disputes, the machines are preserved for the courts to decide upon, other machines are used for next election after resetting the memory.
Though these procedures are easy, many Nigerian citizens are not educated enough enough or have the required skills to operate the system unaccompanied, there is urgent need to educate the citizenry on the usage of the EVS, however, there is no current effort being made to educate the citizenry even when the election period is moths away, this is an uneasy situation.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE VOTING MACHINES
There are many potential problems of the electronic voting machines. These probles stem from the mechanical nature of the machines and corrupt tendency of the machine operators. Electronic voting machine manufacturers and state governments are responding to legitimate concerns with corporate campaigns. SourceWatch (2004) observed that
A voting machine provides vast potential for electoral fraud.. After the Florida 2000 debacle, a "solution" to the ballot counting problem, commonly advocated in both the U.S. and India, was an upgrade of the hardware and software systems used to "punch" and to count ballots. Electronic voting machines have been installed in several states in response to a federal mandate. These electronic machines leave no paper trail by which vote verification or audit can take place.
More reports from the magazine observed that the programming of the voting machines is secret, or at least it was until Diebold's source code was discovered on an insecure ftp server and analysed by independent experts. There is no way for the voter to know his vote was correctly registered, and no way to verify the count when it's done.

The magazine noted that in Georgia, where Diebold Election Systems machines were used, a handful of voters found that when they pressed the screen to vote for one candidate, the machine registered a vote for the opponent. The magazine x-rayed the problems with electronic voting machines thus:
In Alabama, a computer glitch caused a 7,000-vote error and clouded the outcome of the gubernatorial race for two weeks. But more critically, computer scientists charge that the software that runs the machines is riddled with security flaws. In India, the protest has been even more widespread, as the ruling party has proceeded with automating the electoral process uniformly nation-wide - in a democracy of over one billion people, and few resources to challenge results.
The magazine also observed that scientists have analyzed portions of Diebold software source code that was mistakenly left on a public internet site and concluded that a teenager could manufacture "smart cards" and vote several times.Insiders could program the machine to alter election results without detection. All machines had the same password hard-wired into the code. And in some instances, it was set at 1111, a number laughably easy to hack. Because there is no paper or electronic auditing system in the machine, there would be no way to reconstruct an actual vote.
Gumbel (2003) warned that the 2004 United States presidential election may be compromised by new voting machines that computer scientists believe are unreliable, poorly programmed and prone to tampering. Later investigation revealed that tens of thousands of touch screen voting machines may be less reliable than the old punchcards, which famously stalled the presidential election in Florida in 2000, leaving the whole election open to international ridicule.

Dill (2005) argued "These machines do not allow the voters to check that their votes are accurately and permanently recorded. No one can prove that the machines are trustworthy." He further observed three insidences:
the three leading voting machine manufacturers are substantial Republican campaign donors. Walden O'Dell of Diebold, in Ohio, wrote a letter to Republican supporters saying he was "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President next year". Some theorists view it as a grave threat to democracy itself: "The rush towards computerisation is very dubious," Rebecca Mercuri, a research fellow at Harvard University, said. "It takes away the checks and balances of a democratic society." Parallel concerns were raised in India where the entire country was shifted to a single voting machine technology vended by companies close to the ruling party. India ran its first full election using only these machines in 2003.
In the aftermath of the U.S.’s 2004 election, McLean (2004) declared that computerized machines lost votes, subtracted votes instead of adding them, and doubled votes. Because many of these machines had no paper audit trails, a large number of votes would never be counted. And while it was unlikely that deliberate voting-machine fraud changed the result of the presidential election, the Internet was buzzing with rumors and allegations of fraud in a number of different jurisdictions and races.
Technologies get in the way of accuracy by adding speeds. Each additional step means more potential errors, simply because no technology is perfect. Consider an optical-scan voting system. The voter fills in ovals on a piece of paper, which is fed into an optical-scan reader. The reader senses the filled-in ovals and tabulates the votes. This system has several steps: voter to ballot to ovals to optical reader to vote tabulator to centralized total. At each step, errors can occur. If the ballot is confusing, then some voters will fill in the wrong ovals. If a voter doesn’t fill them in properly, or if the reader is malfunctioning, then the sensor won’t sense the ovals properly. Mistakes in tabulation, either in the machine or when machine totals get aggregated into larger totals, also cause errors. A manual system (tallying the ballots by hand and then doing it again to double-check) is more accurate simply because there are fewer steps.
Bugs in software are commonplace, as any computer user knows. Computer programs regularly malfunction, sometimes in surprising and subtle ways. This is true for all software, including the software in computerized voting machines.
openDemocracy.com reviewed some elections conducted with the new electronic voting machines and recorded thus:
In Fairfax County, VA, in 2003, a programming error in the electronic voting machines caused them to mysteriously subtract 100 votes from one particular candidate’s totals. In San Bernardino County, CA in 2001, a programming error caused the computer to look for votes in the wrong portion of the ballot in 33 local elections, which meant that no votes registered on those ballots for that election. A recount was done by hand. In Volusia County, FL in 2000, an electronic voting machine gave Al Gore a final vote count of negative 16,022 votes. The 2003 election in Boone County, IA, had the electronic vote-counting equipment showing that more than 140,000 votes had been cast in the Nov. 4 municipal elections. The county has only 50,000 residents and less than half of them were eligible to vote in this election.
Another issue is that software can be hacked. That is, someone can deliberately introduce an error that modifies the result in favor of his preferred candidate. This has nothing to do with whether electronic voting machines are hooked up to the internet on election day. The threat is that the computer code could be modified while it is being developed and tested, either by one of the programmers or a hacker who gains access to the voting machine company’s network. It’s much easier to surreptitiously modify a software system than a hardware system, and it’s much easier to make these modifications undetectable.
Similar to this is that these problems can have further-reaching effects in software. A problem with a manual machine just affects that machine. A software problem, whether accidental or intentional, can affect many thousands of machines and skew the results of an entire election.
Each stage in the development of voting machines brings in additional solution to the contemporary problem of voting and election at large. However these solutions do not suffice, because they do not totally address the dialectical social problems of voting, the machines have their individual shortcomings and they are easily manipulated and corrupted giving time and resources. Thus while they are arguably bring some degree of solutions, social economic environments of where they are applied are critical to their degree of success. These factors will be discussed in the next chapters.
Comparatively, the voting machines appear to succeed in some area and fail in others. Considering Nigeria situation, the machines may be good but are not the ideal solution. The machines may have worked elsewhere but may not work in Nigeria. First the structures and functions of the machines Nigeria will use as planned by the Independent National Electoral Commission are imported, and will not address the Nigeria peculiar issues as it may have done in the country of origin.
Nnoli (2003) observed that central to the question of voting is who is eligible to vote. There have been incessant issues of ballot stuffing in the past. The machines may dictate multiple voting by one person but it may not dictate voting by ineligible persons like prisoners, mad people and children. Shively (1991) corroborated this and argued that it is evident that not all those who are entitled to vote do vote and vice versa, those who are eligible to vote may be corruptly disqualified, denied the opportunity to vote by deliberate omission/cancellation or by gerrymandering. In 1999, many who registered during l registration process for the 1999 election did not find their names in the voters register at the end and were thereby rendered ineligible to vote. The use of electronic voting machines does not guarantee the absence of this situation especially when is deliberately and corruptly done by the custodian of the machines.
Another issue of concern in that Nigeria lacks the accurate demographic data of its population. Nigeria does not have data on its adult population that is eligible to vote. The machines are garbage in garbage out (GIGO), what is fed into it is what it stored and uses for programming and calculation. Wrong information fed into the machines means failure of the system.
Ball & Peters (2000) argued that voting does not necessarily decide who takes office as electoral corruption may distort the people’s choice. As previously discussed, even the manufacturers of the voting machines who are in partisan politics may configure the machine in favour of their choice candidates.

ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM AND NIGERIAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
PUBLIC LITERACY LEVEL AND FAMILIARITY WITH THE TECHNOLOGY
Two significant differences between the populations of the developed countries and the developing countries like Nigeria are the level of literacy and familiarity with computers and other devices using keyboards, screens, and stored data. While the current Australian literacy rate for adult population (15 years and above) is put at 98%, Nigeria records 68 of same (CIA Fact Sheet, 2005). The Nigerian National Population Commission puts the overall literacy rate at 45%. Brazil records 86% for its adult population of 15 years and above. These days, in the developed countries like United States, literacy is almost never raised as an issue with respect to the choice of voting equipment, but in Nigeria, where the levels are much lower, literacy remains a serious issue consideration.
The public literacy level is one of the greatest challenges to the decision of the INEC to use the EVS in the up-coming elections in Nigeria. Compared with India and other countries whose footsteps Nigeria is following their in the adoption of the EVS, literacy rates are not same. Mojeed (2006) sampling the opinion of many Nigerians noted that that many view that
and dishonesty, one wonders why the INEC Chairman, Maurice Iwu, a learned Professor, and who should know Electronic voting system is too advanced for the Nigerian polity. Even in advanced countries of the world, where you have high level of transparency and integrity, they do tamper with electronic voting device. The case of America in the George W. Bush/Al Gore presidential election is a notable example. With the high level of literacy in America compared with the low level of illiteracy in Nigeria and Nigeria’s proverbial non transparency better, will now insist that we are going for electronic voting.
According to Mojeed, many Nigerians argued that the electronic voting device would be tampered with in Nigeria considering the type of people in the country, Nigeria should continue with the secret ballot system and develop with it until the country is able to get credible, free and fair election. He ran excerpt from Alhaji Adesina;
From my own consideration, the adoption of the electronic voting device by INEC is a grand deceit to tamper with the result of the 2007 general elections. I call for its total rejection," he said also reacting to the electronic voting as being contemplated by the commission
Another prominent opposition reported by Mojeed was Secretary to the Plateau State Government (SSG), Mr. Litta Shindai, who also aruged that the greater percentage of the Nigerians are still illiterate, and as such cannot manage the system effectively well. According to him, opting for the e-voting would mean disenfranchising tens of millions of Nigerians who may not be lettered.
Brazil developed an illiteracy management program vis-à-vis the EVS to reduce the impact of the populations’ inability to read and write on EVS. India also developed and used logos on paper ballots.
To overcome this barrier to the electoral process, Saltman (1998) noted that Brazil adopted a voting system in which candidates can be identified easily by number, as well as by name. Candidates for the two offices voted on in the October 1996 election were each given an individual two- or five-digit number. (The longer identifier was necessary for the second office as there could be more than one candidate from the same party.) Before the election, people displayed posters and placards, even T-shirts, emblazoned with favorite candidates' numbers.
The Brazilian national election authority, reasoned that illiterates could differentiate among numbers much more easily than among names. The voting equipment included a ten-digit numerical keyboard with three other keys for voting actions and a liquid-crystal display screen. When a voter entered the chosen candidate's number, digit-by-digit, on the keyboard, the names of the office, candidate, and party appeared on the screen, and in the case of the first office, the candidate's picture appeared as well.
Saltman (1998) reported that the decision proved sound. Their pervasive television spots instructed people regarding the new system, and helped overcome some voters' lack of familiarity with keyboards and screens. Election observers from many countries reported that people of all classes used the system successfully. Brazil's success with the 1996 election demonstrates the value of centralized development.
Unlike Brazil and India who planned for the illiteracy management in the use of EVS as part of the effort to make the EVS successful, Nigerian election manager are yet to initiate a process in this regards, yet the next national election during which INEC insist it would use the system is few months away. It is also baffling that few months away to the said election when INEC ought to be educating the masses on the EVS it is still in the debate to persuade the National Assembly to accept and support its usage, it thus cast doubt when and if ever INEC will have time to educate the masses on the System, much less planning for illiteracy management on the EVS. Contrary to what is obtainable in many countries that have used the system, great number of the population have knowledge of computer or at least with time and gradual and incremental changes were conversant with the similar electronic voting machines and thus needed little adjustment. In the case of Nigeria, it is total and abrupt change that is being contemplated.
Integrity and Security
Another concern in Nigeria about EVS is the perceived insecurity of the machines and ballots. The security of transportation, from election headquarters to polling stations, of disks or cartridges containing initialization and voter registration data, and the return of those devices with election results after polls close is also an issue of serious concern. Counterfeiting, data modification, or interchange of the devices must be prevented. This protection can be accomplished with the use of modest cryptographic methods. Relatively advanced Nigeria may not have the necessary staff to undertake this activity.
Voter registration, including voter verification at polling stations, is another area in which assurance of accuracy, integrity, and security are necessary for public confidence in reported election results. There are several ways to replace paper-based verification. These methods require a match with pre-stored voter data at the polling station. One such technique is signature-comparison, but as Saltman (1998) pointed out, it may not work in societies with high illiteracy rates. A second method is to issue each voter an identification card with the voter's photograph and containing stored data (either magnetic stripe or chip-based) that can be swiped or inserted in a reader at the polling station. A third method is the matching of a unique physical characteristic of the voter, such as a fingerprint. However, fingerprinting all voters may not be acceptable in Nigeria, where the concept of information privacy is important, and fingerprinting is associated primarily with maintenance of a criminal record. However the challenges here is that there is no known effort to put these in place in Nigeria. The National identity card project for example that would have served as starting point and of great assistance has been a sham.
Political Environment
In most of the developed countries and perhaps some of the developing countries that have adopted EVS, their political environment differ from that of Nigeria. First, the country is just beginning once again to experiment democracy after many years of military rule. The political orientation, the political system as well as the practice of democracy vary greatly with Nigeria with what is now obtainable in these nations.
In the United States (US) for example, Saltman (1998) observed that the U.S. tradition in administering elections is one of local autonomy. Administration is decentralized to the states and, most often further decentralized to counties, cities, and sometimes lesser units. Local governments typically have the right to select their own vote-counting system, often with state-mandated conditions. Similarly, voter registration lists traditionally have been maintained by local government, although there is a trend toward state-maintained lists because of the high mobility of the population, both intra- and interstate, and concern about duplicate registrations.
In Nigeria, the overwhelming tendency is for offices at the national level to plan, develop, and install modern voter registration and voting systems for the entire nation any time there would election. There is no continuity or pre-stored voters’ data or even population data that can be referred to as in many developed countries who Nigeria purport to copy.
Mojeed (2006) reported
Former Governor of Kogi State, Mr. Abubakar Audu. He said Nigeria was not democratically ripe to adopt the proposed e-voting system He said, "I must say that we are not politically sophisticated enough to adopt e-voting. This is a country where a vast majority is still finding it difficult to know how to thumbprint the parties they wish to vote. There is still massive illiteracy all over the place. "I see the adoption of the system as a ploy to bring more confusion into our already confused electoral system.
In the opinion sample ran by Mojeed, some Nigerians argued that electronic voting system will be easily manipulated and may turn out to be worse in election rigging than the current voting system while others alleged that the INEC chairman is doing the bidding of the PDP that wants to perpetuate itself in power as the use of electronic system in the 2007 elections will be manipulated by the PDP to remain in power.
Pindiga (2005) reported that apart from the ruling party that is a protagonist of the EVS, a number of other parties kicked against the idea, saying it was part of the ruling party's grand scheme to perpetuate itself in power. He x-rayed the opinion of the parties
The parties opposed to e-voting accused INEC of complicity in a ploy to rig the 2007 elections in favour of the PDP even before polling kicks-off. Electronic gadgets, they argued, were "garbage-in-garbage-out" which could be made to churn out preset results in favour of the ruling party. They also cautioned that with barely 16 months to the polls, there was no adequate time for preparations and massive production of the e-voting machines for the 2007 polls. An official of one of the opposition parties, Daily Trust learnt, told the INEC chairman that since he (Iwu) was a card-carrying member of the PDP, his impartiality was doubtful.
Supporters of e-voting insisted that since India used it successfully, Nigeria could not fail. However what the proponents of e-voting in Nigeria are yet to harmonise is the political environment of Nigeria and that of India. Also, supporters argued further that it was time that the nation started thinking of how to perfect its democracy by making its polls error-free, something they said e-voting would readily provide, but they have not assured Nigerians the availability of the infrastructure, public enlightenment on EVS, conducive political environment and its cost effectiveness.
Cost Effectiveness
Most countries using electronic voting system, especially the developed countries and India have the history of gradual and incremental modification of the existing voting system to newer version. This allows for cost effective improvement on the existing ones. The changes are at any given point in time weighed against the additional cost effectiveness of the new innovation against the old ones. Here in Nigeria, the proposed system is outright change over from the old to new without the incremental modification from the existing ones that allows for the cost benefit analysis.
The history of administering elections in many developed countries like, Canada, Australia, Britain and United States is characterized as incremental change that focused on the cost effectiveness of the existing system. In the 1890s, the adoption of a standard paper ballot, called the "Australian Ballot" was considered to be a significant advance. The mechanical lever machine came into use in 1898. By the late 1950s, about one-half of all voters in the US for instance cast their ballots on these machines. Saltman (1998) observed that this hundred-year-old technology is still employed in some jurisdictions today. The non-ballot DRE system, in which voters use push-buttons or touch screens, had its beginnings in the middle 1970s. This system, sold by several manufacturers, is poised to replace many of the non-ballot mechanical lever machines currently in use.
Nigeria does not have enough time for the incremental approach, or the resources to allow each local jurisdiction to select its own methods. Political stability demands free and fair elections, undertaken efficiently and effectively with systems that significantly reduce, if not totally prevent, fraud in both voter registration and ballot counting. Therefore, instead of opting for incrementalism or technological diversity, Nigeria want to undertake a immediate centralized, planned, top-down process of replacing paper-based voter identification and balloting with high-tech methods.
This idea may sound plausible but the cost is however alarming. In a country where over 60% of the population live below the poverty level, the cost of such immediate and urgent swap is too burdensome. The sudden introduction of electronic voting system will cost more, yet doubtful effective.
It is note worthy that INEC requested at least sixty billion, five hundred million naira (N60, 500billion) for its operations, if it would guarantee credible elections in 2007. On the floor of the Senate, on Wednesday, January 25, 2006 the INEC chairman, Prof. Iwu, told the Senate Electoral Committee that further delay in appropriating the required money for the commission would hinder the smooth conduct of the polls. He told the committee to get ready to share in the blame if the commission failed to deliver credible elections in 2007 because of a cut in the proposed N60.5 billion. "I want to implore the Senate to approve the said fund, because any kobo less than this N60.5 billion will be a threat to our democracy," Prof. Iwu asserted. So far, N20 billion had been proposed for the purchase of Electronic Voting Machines in the 2006 Appropriation bill
Infrastructure
The lack of modern infrastructure in the rural parts of Nigeria should be considered in the selection of any type of voting system. If INEC chooses a precinct-located vote-counting system, rather than a centrally located one, computerized machines, either DRE devices or computers with ballot-readers, will be needed at many remote locations. Difficulties in logistics, including equipment transportation and maintenance, are more pronounced.
Another consideration is the need for a reliable power source. The current epileptic power supplies in Nigeria and total absence of power in some areas constitute a great challenge to the running of the EVS. The Brazilian system employed the use of external battery to power the system, and in the developed countries like US, the issue of power source is not as problematic as in Nigeria, in fact it is a non-issue. . In Brazil as Saltman observed, the country acquired new DRE units that can run on a 12-volt automobile battery. However, Nigeria has the worst state of power supply, but how INEC plans to overcome this dilemma remains yet uncertain.
In very hot, cold, or humid areas, the lack of a controlled environment also may be a concern. The storage facilities that will guarantee the safety of the machines against weather, damage and even theft or tampering is very crucial.
The centralized ballot-counting system which is being planned by INEC that could be less expensively employed in the largest city or town in a rural region, may overcome many of the logistics problems in supplying equipment, but would still demand the transportation of ballots to and from remote sites.
A centralized DRE system requires transporting the voters themselves to the central location. As a result, urban and rural citizens may have to use different voting systems
Mojeed (2006) quoted Former Governor of Kogi State, Mr. Abubakar Audu, thus
Nigeria is not democratically ripe to adopt the system. "Then the low level of infrastructural development in Nigeria are well known to Iwu. With all these, has he got any justification that we should go for electronic voting? Definitely, the INEC Chairman must have a hidden agenda
Data and Information
While the principle of e-voting seems simple enough, arguments for its implementation are somewhat more complex. Many countries that practice the system have the demographic data of its population that aids the planning and operation of the system. The data guides the decision regarding what should be provided and where, as well as the information on what will work in a particular area and for a particular set of people. In Nigeria, such data does not exist. The country lacks the basic data of its population and its demographic combination. This makes planning a very difficult issue.
In UK for example, while preparing for the adoption and implementation of electronic voting system, they had relevant demographic data that guided the choice of the type of the EVS they adopted. The 2002 publication of the Local Government Association of UK x-rayed the demographic data of the kingdom
By the General election after next …much of the ground should have been prepared for an e-enabled election, offering those who want it the opportunity to vote electronically the possibility include: some may opt to use the fixed line telephone from their homes to cast their vote (93% of UK homes now have fixed line phones and further 6% have mobile phones instead); some use mobile phones to cast their ballot from any location that they feel like (73% of UK adults now have mobile phones); people working away from home or on holidays abroad may use the internet to cast ballot from anywhere in the world (currently 53% of UK adult have used the internet); those who have access to digital TV (currently 8.3 million subscribers) may use interactive capacity that many digital TVs incorporate to cast vote; some may find the current system of postal voting on demand, (1.4 million voters chose to cast a postal ballot in 2001 General election) …many will still prefer the traditional activity of attending a polling station and casting their vote in person.
This type of data is lacking in Nigeria yet the country is purporting to follow the footstep of these developed countries when it does not have the least of the supporting data and instrument needed to implement the system.
Acceptability
The national Assembly conducted public hearing in the six geo-political zones of the country in January 2006 on the use of the machines, the chairman of the committee on the hearing Hon. Hamisu Shira, revealed that the views collated during the exercise was not favourable to the use of the machines. "People vehemently rejected the use of EVM as it has not been tested in the country before now," he said. He noted that some of the people that presented memoranda at the hearing pointed out that the United States (US) tested the machine for 10 years and Brazil for 15 years before adopting it. "My worry is that we in the National Assembly have not taken a position on the use of the device”
If the trustworthiness of the future elections are to be achieved, the people must be consulted, carried along and they ought to understand and accept the new voting system. Their understanding of the new system is crucial for them to participate and as well monitor the operation and effectiveness of the system. Any thing less than the peoples’ consent in the introduction of the new voting system is an aberration and will be rejected by the people. It is therefore the role of INEC and other proponent of the change to convince and get the peoples’ consent.
Corruption
If the plan by INEC works out, when millions of Nigerians go to their polling places to cast their ballots in 2007, they will use a new fangled electronic voting machine and register their votes with a touch of the screen. No hanging chads, no butterfly ballots. These new voting machines, going by the experiences of the countries that have used them, provide no tangible voter-verified output or record of each individual ballot cast. If something goes wrong or if a ballot dispute arises, the computers’ word for it will have to be taken just like that. This could be a big step backward for honest elections.
The concern is not merely hypothetical. The possibility of malfunction or malicious tampering is a very real one. Warf (2004) noted that
Many news organizations, including The New York Times, have reported these machines are vulnerable to hacking and have produced unexplained data irregularities. Critics have documented instances of unauthorized source code "updates" being made just before an election. It has also been revealed that the president of Diebold, a major manufacturer of touch screen systems, is active in partisan politics, writing in a Republican fund-raising solicitation he is "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president" in 2004.
One don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to think these electronic voting systems could be corrupted as he had noted.
If one machine is in error, an entire election could be swayed, with absolutely no way of correcting the mistake - certainly not a "minor problem." Zau (2003) ran a review of the partisan affiliation of the electronic machine providers in US that are likely to have their ways into Nigerian system:
In Illinois, Populex is the company that is creating the electronic voting system for the state. It was recently revealed that Ronald Reagan’s former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci now serves on the company’s five-member Advisory Board. Carlucci is also the chairman emeritus of The Carlyle Group, the defense contractor often called the "Ex-President's Club" because of the high profile partners and advisors on its payroll. These include key players from George W Bush’s inner circle, such as former President Bush and former Secretary of State James Baker III.
Zau observed that what the United States had was a company that was giving money, hand over fist and helping in campaign strategizing for a particular political party at the same time as making the machines that count the votes, he cited Bev Harris, author of Black Box Voting: Ballot-Tampering in the 21st Century; obviously there is no evidence of any conspiracy to tamper with election results - but the fact that such tampering is possible and that the people who are in a position to do it are highly partisan actors who may be able to fix elections without leaving any evidence is more than enough to warrant serious concern. One simply don't need actual evidence of actual election fraud in order to assert that there exist systemic flaws that need to be corrected. The appearance of honesty is just as important as the existence of actual honesty - and, right now, appearances are pretty poor.
The best-known type of attack on a voting system is one that changes the vote totals from what voters actually cast. “Historically, corrupt officials or partisans, one of the most famous examples being Tammany Hall in New York City, ‘the ballots made no result’, the counters made the result, have performed such tampering” (Fischer, 2003). Sometimes, others who stood to benefit from a particular outcome would be involved, as was reportedly the case with respect to allegations of vote buying in Indiana with money, Fisher observed.

This could potentially be done, for example, if voting or counting machines in precincts used modem connections for transmittal of tallies to the central election office, and a tamperer could use that connection before the polls closed to send results to another location. The goal of such tampering would generally be to influence the final vote tally so as to guarantee a particular result. That could be accomplished by several means, such as adding, dropping, or switching votes. Many of the features of modern voting systems — such as secret balloting and the use of observers are designed to thwart such threats.

The impact of such vote tampering depends on several factors. Two of the most important are the scale of an attack and the competitiveness of the contest. An attack would have to have sufficient impact to affect the outcome of the election. For that to happen, scale is critical. If tampering impacts only one ballot or one voting machine, the chances of that affecting the election outcome would be small. But tampering that affects many machines or the results from several precincts could have a substantial impact, although it might also be more likely to be detected. The scale of attack needed to affect the outcome of an election depends on what proportion of voters favor each candidate. The more closely contested an election is, the smaller the degree of tampering that would be necessary to affect the outcome.

It is noteworthy that Nigeria still record high in the global corruption. Apart from the corruption the EVS is vulnerable to, there are numerous other electoral malpractices and corruption that have eaten into the national fabric. Nigeria has a good number of records where the most favour candidate by the electorates turn out to lose the election while the most hated of the electorates swoop the polls – the Nigerian electoral magic.
Culture and Tradition
Nigeria is about to copy the US “voting success” enhanced by electronic voting machines, but this is based on a long term of changes US has made over the past 150 years to the systems they use to conduct elections which developed from a simple to complex machines. These changes have made fraud difficult, (though fraud cases still occur) and as a result, a culture of honesty has had the freedom to emerge among those who conduct elections. Nigeria has never employed any form of electronic voting machine in its elections and when it intends to it swiftly moved into imported complex one. The challenge is to make sure that, in introducing new voting technology, it does not introduce new opportunities for fraud and thereby weaken the nascent democracy on which the future and continued existence of the country rest.
The Prospects of Adopting Electronic Voting System in Nigeria
There are many potentials prospects electronic voting may offer when used in Nigeria. These potentials are not just possibilities but are realities. What those that oppose it application in Nigerian elections are arguing is the preponderance of the prospects over the numerous shortcomings of the machines and unprepared local environment.
In a view of Nigeria’s aspiration to join the list of countries practicing electronic voting system, voters will in a near future no longer be required to visit precinct polling places to cast their ballots. Voters will be able to cast ballots in their home precinct from any polling place, from voting kiosks in shopping malls, libraries and other public places, and from their home computers. These opportunities further provide numerous prospects, challenges as well as problems. The prospects include difficulties in rigging election, accessibility to disabled persons, quick counting and simplicity.
Electoral Riggings Made Difficult
There are patterns of electronic voting machines that would make rigging more difficult, and provide evidence of rigging, if it ever takes place. It will eliminate most of the complaints on which election petitions are based would protect their rights better. Electronic voting can be a better source of indisputable evidence for the electoral tribunals. Duru (2005) quoted Professor Maurice Iwu, the INEC chairman, he insisted that the system was not merely an Electronic Voting Machine as people have termed it nor will it be e-voting but a system which would ensure that even if some politicians destroy any of the components in their attempts to win at all costs, the devices would enable him to have the total number of votes cast in any of the polling booths across the country.

He further noted that, in order to beat the system whereby politicians buy up voters’ registers and in situations where non-existent voters are registered, it would be difficult for those who do not have genuine cards to cast their votes. He also promised that as a voter is casting his vote on the ballot box the system would be registering in 27,000 places at the same time adding: “Even if you snatch the ballot boxes, it will not have any effect because I will be seeing the results in my office in Abuja as the voting is going on throughout the country.
Iwu pointed out that the system is cheaper and that Nigeria can afford it since it happens to be the most effective way of correcting the several electoral problems that have bedeviled the country since independence.
Language Breakthrough
Each Each machine can easily be programmed to display ballots in different languages. The machines can be programmed in the local languages, or made to include numerous languages that are used locally. In each community the language that is predominantly used in could be called up and used to operate the system. The advantage with respect to ballots in different languages appears to be unique to electronic voting. Vinson (2005) presented the example of King County, Washington's demographics that required them under U.S. federal election law to provide ballot access in Chinese, although only 24 people in the county requested Chinese ballots in the September 17, 2002 primary election. This would of immense advantage for those who have difficulty in the understanding of english language as many local languages can be programed
Accessibility for Disabled Persons
The electronic machines can be made fully accessible for persons with disabilities. Vinson (2005) noted that there are certainly benefits to having computerized voting systems, one of the most important of which is the enfranchisement of blind and disabled voters, for whom the technology now exists to vote secretly and without assistance. He however noted that optical scanning, the only other method that rivals electronic systems for efficiency, and which, according to a CalTech/MIT study from July of 2001, many ballot systems that currently provides the highest degree of accuracy, cannot provide this service.
Electronic machines can use headphones and other adaptive technology to provide the necessary accessibility for the disabled, especially the blind
Simple and Convenience
Jacob (2005) quoting the chairman of Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) Professor Maurice Iwu, explained that voting machines will display ballots on flat panel displays, and voting will be a simple matter of touching the screen to pick a candidate. Voting machines connected to the web will add a new dimension; allowing voters to bring up candidate or issue group web pages if they need more information to make an informed choice.
Regarding the convenience, Jones (2000) argued that these new technologies would make voting far more convenient. More people will participate, higher voter turnout will lend greater legitimacy to the electoral process, and as a result, the tide of voter apathy that has swept the country since 1970 will come to an end.
As in the ordinary use of computer in everyday usage, activities are simplified with the aid of computer. The EVS as well enhances the simplicity and convenience of voting process as well as in counting and quick result delivery
Quick Counting
Similar to the issue of simplicity, electronic counting is no doubt substantially quicker than physically moving piles of papers to count preferences. “We will no-longer have to wait days for official election results, contenting ourselves with unofficial results gathered by the press” (Jacob, 2005) He posits that within minutes after the polls close, the network of voting machines will communicate with local and state computers to calculate the official election results.
With the aid of the computer operated counting, result of the election can be processed faster. Also the computer assisted counting will save time and money. The job that would take 200 persons two weeks to do may be processed with modern computers in less than 30 minutes.
It is accepted that human error is a part of any manual count of preferences. It may be that the complexities of counting vote counting can be more accurately handled by an electronic than human count.

The Problems of Adopting Electronic Voting System in Nigeria
Errors And Malfunctions
The challenges of the use of electronic voting from many quarters come because of errors and malfunctions that occur in real life elections. In the United States, it was reported according to Vinson, that on election day in 2004, 2269 machine problems were reported. Such can result in the rapid rollout of the unproven and vulnerable technology without the proper scrutiny that is due to an unproven system.
Jones (2004) also noted that in Fairfax County, Virginia in November 4, 2003. Machines quit, jammed the modems in voting systems when 953 voting machines called in simultaneously to report results, leading to a denial of service attack on the election. 50% of precincts were unable to report results until the following day. Also, some voters complained that they would cast their vote for a particular candidate and the indicator of that vote would go off shortly after. Had they not noticed, their vote for that candidate would have remained uncounted; an unknown number of voters were affected by this.

Warf (2004) observed that electronic counting algorithm had to be independently audited twice to ensure no errors occurred during the distribution of preferences. In Nigeria, how many would understand options of the machines? There is currently no known effort to audit the machines and their applications that would be used for the up coming elections.
Greater Possibility Of Large-Scale Electoral Fraud
Some people challenge the use of electronic voting because of its much greater possibility of large-scale electoral fraud, both from inside the electoral apparatus and from outside it. Ezulike et al (2005) x-rayed the opinion of stakeholders of non PDP extradition as being opposed to the idea of the INEC chairman, Professor Maurice Iwu who declared that his commission proposed use of electronic voting in future polls is irreversible just as he disclosed that only foreign observers and not monitors would be allowed to participate in the elections.
However, disagreeing with the commission, the respondents said adoption of electronic voting would make the nation’s electoral process prone to manipulation and was part of a plot to rig the polls in favour of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Campaign for Democracy (CD), in its reaction, stated that INEC’s declaration in that regard was "a shadow of the 2007 rigging plans by the present President Olusegun Obasanjo administration to perpetuate itself in power. INEC’s opposition to foreign monitors is coming against the backdrop of the exposition of foreign monitors on the 2003 election that it was not an election, a fact later confirmed by Nigeria’s court of law
Verifiability and Transparency
In current DREs, the actions that occur between ballot screen and the final vote tally are not subject to human observation. The voter sees a visual representation of the ballot on the computer screen or face of the DRE. When the voter pushes the button to cast the ballot, the machine records the votes electronically. That means that a voter cannot know if the machine recorded the choices the voter saw on the screen or some other choices, and an observer also cannot check to see if all ballots cast are counted correctly.

Other challenges of the use of electronic voting come from a theoretical point of view, humans are not equipped for verifying operations which occur in the microscopic scale within nanosecond timeframes. Thus, for people who did not program them, computers act just like black boxes and their operations can truly be verified only by knowing the input and comparing the expected output with the actual output. Under a secret ballot system, there is no known input, nor is there any expected output with which to compare electoral results. Hence, electronic electoral result cannot be verified by humans and the people need to have an absolute faith in the accuracy, honesty and security of the whole electoral apparatus (people, software and hardware). Requiring reliance on such faith is clearly not compatible with Democracy. Vinson (2003) posed mind-searching questions about the EVS;
Will electronic voting machines allow (1) a voter's verification of her or his choice, and (2) post-election auditing? Most of the current debate has swirled around the presence or absence of paper trails - some physical, printed scrap of evidence that a voter's selection is valid, and remains unchanged throughout its entire electronic life. Why, you may ask, should there be any debate about a paper trail? After all, HAVA stipulated "manual audit capacity" and a "permanent paper record." It turns out that various electronic machine vendors have interpreted the phrase "permanent paper record" to mean printing out results after the election. These vendors claim that voter verification occurs at the time the voter is reviewing his or her selections on the touch screen, and that auditing can occur electronically. And some computer scientists agree, at least in theory. But vendors that do offer paper ballot printing, and a growing number of influential computer scientists, argue that electronic voting machines must produce a printed paper ballot for bona fide voter verification, as well as a means for a valid recount in the event of a contested election.
Security and Evolving Threat Environment
The software used in electronic voting machines is often not available for public review, it could contain undetected mistakes or deliberate cheating. Warf (2004) noted that Clint Curtis, a former employee of Yang Enterprises, stated that, in 2000, at the request of Congressman Tom Feeney, who was then the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Curtis developed a "vote fraud software prototype" that could alter machine results.

The fact that the elections go on smoothly is no comfort—the whole problem with electronic voting is that someone could swoop in and change votes without anybody knowing it or even without leaving a trace behind.
Vinson noted that Diebold Election Services, Inc. president admitted security flaws and disenfranchised voters in the March 2, 2004 California presidential primary using Diebold's TSx system for DRE voting. On April 30 California's secretary of state decertified all touch-screen machines and recommended criminal prosecution of Diebold Election Systems. The California Attorney-General decided against criminal prosecution, but joined a lawsuit against Diebold for fraudulent claims made to election officials. Considering the vulnerability of Nigeria to various forms of insecurity and fraud, how does INEC intend to solve these puzzles should they arise in Nigeria? Is there any means of checking them before hand?

While attacks that added, subtracted, or changed individual votes are of particular concern, other kinds of attacks also need to be considered. One type of attack might gather information that a candidate could use to increase the chance of winning. For example, if vote totals from particular precincts could secretly be made known to operatives for one candidate before the polls closed, 35 the results could be used to adjust get-out-the-vote efforts, giving that candidate an unfair advantage.
Another type of attack might be used to disrupt voting. For example, malware could be used to cause voting machines to malfunction frequently. The resulting delays could reduce turnout, perhaps to the benefit of one candidate, or could even cause voters to lose confidence in the integrity of the election in general. The latter might be of more interest to terrorists or others with an interest in having a negative impact on the political system generally. The INEC chairman, Prof. Iwu has argued that vote tampering will be detected from his office anywhere it happened but he has failed to convince Nigerians that his own office, even staff or the machine vendors can be trusted.
The growing use of information technology in elections has had unique impacts on the threat environment. It provides the opportunity for new kinds of attacks and new kinds of attackers. As information technology has advanced and cyberspace has grown, so too have the rate and sophistication of cyber attacks in general. The number of reported computer-security violations has grown exponentially in the past decade, from about 100 in 1989 to more than 100,000 in the first three quarters of 2003 (Mercuri & Neumann, 2003) Fisher (2003) observed that
Potential threats may now come from many sources — amateur or professional hackers using the Internet, insiders in organizations, organized crime, terrorists, or even foreign governments. With respect to election tampering, some such attackers could benefit in traditional ways, but some, such as terrorists, might be interested instead in disrupting elections or reducing the confidence of voters in the electoral process. New and more ingenious kinds of Malware are constantly being invented and used. There are now tens of thous